Francois Joseph Paul comte de Grasse - born into an old noble family in southern France in 1722 - was a career officer in the French navy, and served the king in campaigns in the Mediterranean, in India, and in the Caribbean. [In 1779] his health failing, the 58-year old officer sailed for France in late 1780.

His stay in France was short. On 22 March 1781, Louis XVI promoted de Grasse to rear admiral, and sent him back to the West Indies with 20 ships of the line, three frigates and 156 transport. Concurrently, the vicomte de Rochambeau sailed for Newport with badly needed cash for his father, and the news that the second division of infantry would not be coming after all. Rochambeau was free to draw up his own plans for the coming campaign, possibly in cooperation with de Grasse, who could provide naval support.

As de Grasse was sailing for San Domingo, Rochambeau on 8 June learned of the admiral's arrival in the West Indies. On 15 June Rochambeau had information from de Grasse that he would be in San Domingo later that month and could be in American waters by 15 July at the earliest. Rochambeau immediately dispatched the aptly named Concorde to San Domingo to apprise de Grasse of Franco-American plans. He also informed him of Cornwallis's arrival in Virginia, and hinted strongly that he would prefer de Grasse to sail for the Chesapeake:

There are two points at which an offensive can be made against the enemy; the Chesapeak and New York. The southwesterly winds and the state of defense in Virginia will probably make you prefer the Chesapeak Bay, and it will be there [sic] where we think you may be able to render the greatest service…. In any case it is essential that you send, well in advance, a frigate to inform de Barras where you are to come and also General Washington.

Upon reading this letter in mid-July 1781, de Grasse opted to sail for the Chesapeake. His choice involved considerable risk, since it was based upon reading between the lines of Rochambeau's letter. If the Franco-American army remained before New York rather than marching to Virginia, the campaign of 1781 would end in failure, and [de Grasse] would return from America in disgrace.

The stage was set when de Grasse raised anchor with 28 ships of the line and supporting frigates at Cap Francais (Haiti) on 5 August and headed north. His ships were bursting with passengers: an 80-gun-ship, 190 feet long, a 46-foot beam with a hold of 22 feet, carried a regular crew of some 940 men. They were also carrying some 3,000 men of the infantry regiments Gatinais, Agenais, and Touraine under the comte de Saint-Simon, 100 artillerymen, their guns, and 100 dragoons.

Along the way de Grasse dispatched the frigate Aigrette to Havana to pick up 1.2 million livres that Rochambeau had requested in July to pay and feed his army. It took all of five hours to collect these funds from public and private sources, and on 17 August the Aigrette rejoined de Grasse's fleet.

On 31 August de Grasse's fleet dropped anchor in the mouth of the York and the next day began unloading men and material for the siege of Cornwallis.

De Grasse's hour of glory was still to come. Cruising off Cape Charles, the lookout of the Aigreete at around 9:30 a.m. on 5 September reported sails approaching from east-northeast. The sails were those of Vice Admiral Thomas Graves, Rear Admirals Samuel Hood and Sir Francis Drake and their 19 ships. Going full speed, around 6 knots, or 7 mph, they were making straight for the main entrance of the bay.

Though he knew that 19 sails were approaching Hampton Roads, there was not much de Grasse could do. Wind and tide were against him, and much of his personnel was on land. De Grasse had to leave some 90 officers and about 1,900 men behind when he cut cables around noon as the tide was turning. De Grasse moved out of the channel to meet the enemy. Short of hands and hampered by the north-northeast wind, they were slow forming a battle line: De Grasse, the 11th ship in line, did not clear the bay until almost 1:00 p.m.

Rather than order "close action" and head straight for the French line as it was straggling out of the bay, Graves at around 2:15 p.m. gave order to get into "line ahead" formation: Graves wanted to bring his vessels into a roughly parallel position with the approaching French fleet. The maneuver not only took 1˝ hours to perform, it also greatly extended the heretofore tight formation of the British fleet. This gave the French time to clear the entrance of the bay. As Graves lined up for battle, his fastest ships, which had been in the lead, found themselves at the end of the column. That included Hood on the Barfleur, who had been fourth in line, but now had fifteen ships ahead of him.

As the ships took their places in the line, Graves, much to the consternation of his officers, ordered them to wait for the French center to come abreast. This allowed de Grasse to bring up his rear. When battle commenced, he not only would have five more ships and 1,794 cannons versus 1,410 British guns - but thanks to Graves, they would also be sailing in closer formation than their opponents. His best and fastest ships would line up with Graves's slowest and weakest. The two fleets were arranged like the sides of a funnel when Graves raised the flag to head toward the enemy. According to the Londori's log, it was precisely 3:46 p.m.; six hours had passed since the fleets had spied each other. What happened next has been debated ever since.

Hood later claimed that Graves forgot to lower the flag signaling "line ahead" as the standard "close action" went up. Graves maintained that he flew "engage the enemy" throughout the day and hoisted "line ahead" only twice. Hood and his captains, according to Graves, misunderstood the signal. Irrespective of the flag signals, once the cannon began roaring, Hood knew that the battle had begun and should have fallen on the French rear. Why he did not will always remain a mystery.

Confusion reigned on board the British fleet: Drake's leaky division followed the signal and at 4:15 p.m. the Shrewsbury opened fire, but with the wind blowing toward land and the French fleet, British vessels could only use their upper gun decks while the French could employ their full firepower. Hood continued with "line ahead," until Graves sent a frigate ordering him to attack at once. But the French held the advantage: when hundreds of cannon began to spit fire and destruction, de Grasse's ships fired broadside after broadside into Drake's division, which still had to turn before its cannon could reach them. Seven ships, including Hood's Barfleur, never caught up. At 5:30 p.m. they began trading long-distance fire; an hour later Graves ordered the fleet to disengage.

Both fleets spent the next day, 6 September, making repairs and drifted to the south on the 7th. At nightfall on the 9th, de Grasse headed back north. As he approached he saw de Barras' fleet riding at anchor in Lynnhaven Bay. De Grasse knew that he had achieved his goal; Washington and Rochambeau were on the way, and with de Barras' seven ships of the line and two transports safely in the Bay, Cornwallis was caught. Graves returned briefly to the Chesapeake on the 13th only to find de Barras there. Seeing that it would be unwise to attack the now 35 French ships with his 18, Graves - unaware that Rochambeau and Washington were marching on [to] Yorktown - returned to New York. On his arrival, he was dejected. He wrote to the Earl of Sandwich, "The signal was not understood. I do not mean to blame anyone, my Lord. I hope we all did our best."

De Grasse's victory at the Capes highlights more than any other event the vital importance of the French navy for American independence. It was de Grasse's fleet that kept the Royal Navy form rescuing Cornwallis when it sailed out to meet the British on 5 September 1781. There was no Continental Navy that could have stopped Graves, Hood and Drake.

Though he spent but two months in American waters and never set foot on American soil, de Grasse is among the three Frenchmen who contributed most to American independence. His "strategic vision" writes Jonathan R. Dull, "made possible the most important naval victory of the 18th century."

Robert Selig is a professionally trained historian, scholar, lecturer, consultant, editor, and writer. He served as historical consultant for a three-year project of the State of Connecticut entitled "Rochambeau in Connecticut: Tracing His Journey." When President Clinton on 9 November 2000 signed Public Law 106-472, authorizing the National Park Service to conduct a resource study of the Washington-Rochambeau Revolutionary Route Selig served as on the committee as a historian. This article was reprinted with permission from Selig and the National Park Service. He can be reached at rselig@remc7.k12.mi.us.